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TWO-TIERED TRADEMARKS
Glynn S. Lunney, Jr.*
ABSTRACT
Today, we have a two-tiered trademark system. In the upper
tier, both parties can afford to litigate. In the lower tier, only one
party can. This two-tiered system has arisen over the last century
because courts refused to follow the law. Faced with enforcing
trademark law that led to seemingly unjust outcomes, courts re-
wrote trademark law. When those rewrites led to different sorts of
apparent injustices, courts rewrote trademark law again. And they
did not do so as part of any systematic and coherent plan; instead,
judges rewrote the law through ad hoc decision-making, attempt-
ing to achieve what they perceived to be justice for the parties be-
fore them. The net result has been a sharp increase in the com-
plexity, uncertainty, and expense associated with trademark
disputes. As a result, many entities can no longer afford to partic-
ipate in the trademark system at all. They can afford neither to
defend themselves against overreaching assertions of trademark
infringement nor to assert their rights against straightforward
acts of infringement. For a party who cannot afford the high cost
of trademark litigation, when a dispute arises, the party loses. To
remedy this situation, I call for a return to simpler rules in trade-
mark law and to an increased reliance on the registration system
as a less expensive means to resolve trademark disputes.
* Professor of Law, Texas A&M University School of Law. I would like to thank
participants at the University of Houston Law Center's Intellectual Property and Infor-
mation Law 2018 Program in Santa Fe, as well as Rebecca Tushnet, for their helpful com-
ments and criticisms. I have adapted Part III.A. of this Article from material I previously
published. See Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Trademark's Judicial De-Evolution: Why Courts Get
Trademark Cases Wrong Repeatedly, 106 CAL. L. REV. 1195, 1208-13 (2018).
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I. INTRODUCTION
Sometimes, the price of seeking perfect justice is no justice at
all. Perhaps nowhere is this more evident than in trademark law
today. Over the last century, courts have both moved from rules to
standards in, and increased the complexity of, trademark law.
These transitions have not been part of a systemic and coherent
plan for trademark law but the result of individual courts attempt-
ing to achieve what particular judges in particular cases perceived
as justice for the particular parties before them. In seeking perfect
justice in individual cases, courts have moved from predictable,
but imperfect, rules to more open-ended, and theoretically better-
tailored, standards on central issues, such as the scope of trade-
mark protection. When the resulting infringement standard has
proven overbroad, they have created a variety of idiosyncratic de-
fenses available to particular defendants in particular cases on
particular issues. All of this they have done seeking justice. Yet,
through these changes, courts have made trademark litigation
both sharply more expensive and more unpredictable. Seeking
perfect justice may have improved trademark law's ability to reach
just outcomes for those entities with the resources to afford the
increased cost and uncertainty of the system. However, many en-
tities can no longer afford to participate in the system at all. They
can afford neither to defend themselves against overreaching as-
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sertions of trademark infringement nor to assert their own trade-
mark rights, even against straightforward acts of infringement.
For these entities, the judicial desire to achieve perfect justice has
meant no justice at all.
As a result of this search for perfect justice, trademark law
has become a two-tiered system. In the upper tier, the parties on
both sides of a dispute can afford to litigate. For disputes that fall
in this tier, trademark law today can achieve reasonably sensible
outcomes in most cases. However, in the lower tier, while one party
can afford to litigate, the other cannot.1 For disputes that fall in
the lower tier, the party that cannot afford the high and increasing
cost of participation in the trademark system loses. They lose not
because justice, or some version of it, dictates that they lose but
because they cannot afford to participate in the system. Because
of this, the trademark system will often resolve two disputes that
are nearly identical on the merits differently. Instead of turning
on sensible considerations of efficiency, justice, or welfare, resolu-
tion will turn solely on which party can afford to litigate. 2
Unfortunately, although courts created this problem, they are
ill-equipped to recognize it, let alone correct it. Courts see only the
cases that are brought before them. As a general rule, they will,
therefore, see only trademark cases from the upper tier, where
both parties can afford to litigate. Because the trademark system
tends to produce reasonably sensible outcomes when both parties
can afford to litigate, courts see only reasonably just outcomes.
They never see trademark cases from the lower tier. By definition,
one of the parties in this tier cannot afford litigation. As a result,
these disputes are usually resolved before they ever come to court.
They may be resolved by one party choosing to avoid conduct to
which the party has a formal legal entitlement that it cannot af-
ford to exercise. They may be resolved by a cease-and-desist letter,
followed by a quick settlement. Or they may be resolved by the
filing of a complaint, followed by settlement. But they will seldom
be resolved through a full course of litigation. As a result, courts
will almost never see the injustice that the current trademark laws
1. There is a lower tier where neither party can afford to litigate. While a full dis-
cussion of this tier is beyond the scope of this Article, in my experience, parties in this tier
engage in elaborate bluffs and counterbiuffs. Obtaining a corporate name registration from
a state secretary of state is usually taken as conclusive evidence that a name complies with
trademark law.
2. While it may sometimes be the case that an ability to afford litigation provides
some evidence of the economic value of a given position, that is not generally the case in
trademark law. With imperfect markets for financing litigation, all that a better ability to
afford litigation usually indicates is which party is established and which party is a new
entrant.
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inflict. They will see the outcomes only in those cases in which both
parties can afford to litigate. So long as trademark law produces
just outcomes in those cases, courts will see justice for some and
assume that that means justice for all.
Perversely, it is the desire of judges to do justice that has
brought us to this state of injustice. If judges had only followed the
law instead, justice might have been achieved. But when trade-
mark law led to seemingly unjust outcomes in the case before
them, courts refused to follow the law. Instead, to ensure a just
outcome in the case before them, courts rewrote trademark law.
This was and is a mistake. Courts can never determine the optimal
set of legal rules for all potential trademark disputes. They don't
see the big picture. They see only the little picture of the case be-
fore them. Unfortunately, in trademark law, the little picture is
not always, or even usually, representative of the big picture. For
that reason, even if courts could devise the optimal legal rules for
the litigated cases, those legal rules would not be optimal for the
full range of potential disputes.
To correct this, Congress and courts should return us to the
simpler rules of yesteryear. Trying to achieve perfect justice in
trademark law effectively excludes many small and medium-sized
businesses from meaningful participation in the trademark sys-
tem. Exclusion represents a more fundamental form of
injustice-a difference in kind. In contrast, the imperfect justice
that simple rules achieve is merely a form of injustice different in
degree.
We begin our examination of trademark's two-tiered system
with a tale of two cases that illustrate the two tiers. On the merits,
the two cases are very similar. Yet, the trademark system resolved
them quite differently. In the first, both parties could afford to lit-
igate. In the second, one party, the defendant, could not. As a re-
sult, in the first, the defendant was allowed to continue its use. In
the second, the defendant was prohibited from doing so. Section
III examines how the trademark system has arrived at this state.
It demonstrates that the desire of judges to do justice led them to
change trademark law so that they could reach their desired result
in a given case. Unfortunately, because of stare decisis, changing
trademark law in a particular case does not change the law just
for that case. Instead, when judges make things up, it becomes the
law for all future cases. Unfortunately, all judges see is the case
right in front of them. What may seem perfectly sensible for that
case often becomes pernicious when applied to the full range of
potential trademark disputes. And even when sensible across a
broad range of disputes, a "more perfect" formulation of trademark
law is often far more expensive to administer and uncertain in its
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applicability. Section IV illustrates how this increased cost and
uncertainty generates a two-tiered trademark system. Despite the
theoretical advantages of a more perfect standard over a less per-
fect rule, Section IV demonstrates that when one party cannot af-
ford the higher administrative cost and greater uncertainty of the
standard, switching from the rule to the standard leads to injus-
tice.
Before we begin, let me acknowledge at the outset that the
access-to-justice concerns I identify are not unique to trademark
law. Nor are they the only difficulty that small businesses face to-
day. Nevertheless, focusing on the costs of complexity in trade-
mark law can serve both as a cautionary tale regarding the costs
of complexity generally and as a reminder that complexity is de-
sirable, given its inevitable costs, only if it achieves some real wel-
fare gains. In trademark law, that is not the case. Compared to far
simpler and less expensive rules, in trademark law, the more
costly and complex standards courts have adopted exclude many
from participation and yet yield no offsetting welfare gains.
II. A TALE OF TWO CASES
We begin with an example of the two-tiered trademark system
in operation. In November 1972, Standard Oil of New Jersey re-
named and rebranded itself Exxon.3 Before that time, it had oper-
ated under three different marks. In states awarded to it as part
of the 1911 Standard Oil antitrust settlement, it operated as Esso. 4
In other states, it operated as either Humble or Enco.5 To create a
unified brand going forward, it coined and adopted the Exxon
mark. 6 In 1999, Exxon merged with Mobil Oil to form
ExxonMobil.7 Both the Exxon and the ExxonMobil marks in their
characteristic colors and fonts are immediately recognizable today.
E* ON EvzonMobil
EXXON, Registration No. 968,512; EXXONMOBIL, Registration No. 2,791,743
3. Exxon Corp. v. Tex. Motor Exch. of Hous., Inc., 628 F.2d 500, 502 (5th Cir. 1980).
4. Exxon Corp. v. Exxene Corp., 696 F.2d 544, 546 (7th Cir. 1982).
5. Id.
6. Id. at 546-47.
7. Exxon-Mobil Merger Done, CNNMONEY (Nov. 30, 1999, 5:10 PM),
http://money.cnn.com/1999/11/30/dealsexxonmobil [http://perma.cc/TUZ9-F99T1.
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In addition to using and registering the interlocking double X
mark, Exxon has also periodically enforced it. In terms of cases
which have led to published opinions, Exxon unsuccessfully op-
posed the registration on the principal register of the trademark
EXXELLO for commercial ice cream makers.11 Exxon unsuccess-
fully asserted trademark infringement claims against the mark
EXXENE for coatings and precoated plastic sheets applied to mo-
torcycle and snowmobile windshields. 12 It also asserted state law
dilution claims against the mark OXXFORD for men's clothing. 13
Our tale concerns two more recent cases. In October 2013,
Exxon sued Fox Networks asserting trademark infringement and
related claims over Fox's FXX logo for a new television network.
Like the Exxon logo, the FXX logo features interlocking double Xs.
Compared to the double Xs in Exxon, however, the position of the
two Xs in FXX is reversed, with the left X below and the right X
above, as shown below:
FXX, Registration No. 85,883,187 (abandoned in 2015 after an
inter partes decision by the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board)
For two years, from October 2013 until October 2015, the par-
ties battled. Multiple experts, including myself, were hired. 14 Sur-
veys were performed. Motions to dismiss, motions in limine, mo-
tions for summary judgment, and motions to exclude testimony
11. Exxon Corp. v. Nat'l Foodline Corp., 579 F.2d 1244, 1245 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
12. Exxon Corp. v. Exxene Corp., 696 F.2d 544, 546-47, 551 (7th Cir. 1982).
13. Exxon Corp. v. Oxxford Clothes, Inc., 109 F.3d 1070, 1073 (5th Cir. 1997). The
mark OXXFORD without interlocking Xs remains federally registered. OXXFORD, Regis-
tration No. 510,041.
14. I was hired by Fox Networks to examine Exxon's enforcement activity with re-
spect to the interlocking double X mark. The Westlaw filings for the case include expert
reports by Professor Ravi Dahr, Dr. Itamar Simonson, and Dr. David Stewart that were
filed in connection with a motion to exclude. See Expert Report of Professor Ravi Dhar,
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. FX Networks, LLC, No. 4:13-CV-02906 (S.D. Tex. June 2, 2015); Ex-
pert Report of Dr. Imitar Simonson, FX Networks, LLC, No. 4:13-CV-02906 (May 29, 2015);
Expert Report of David Stewart, Ph.D., A Likelihood of Confusion Survey in the Matter of
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. FX Networks, LLC, et al., FXNetworks, LLC, No. 4:13-CV-02906 (Apr.
28, 2015).
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were filed. 15 The district court issued opinions on two of the mo-
tions. It denied a motion to dismiss the state law dilution claims
on preemption grounds, and it granted in part and denied in part
a motion for summary judgment on Exxon's claim to actual dam-
ages. 16 Just a few weeks before the scheduled trial, the parties set-
tled.17 Although the precise terms of the settlement are confiden-
tial, Fox Networks continues to use the interlocking double Xs in
the logo for its FXX network.' 8
Just as the Fox Networks case finished up, the second case in
our tale began. On October 27, 2015, Exxon sued Nielsen Spirits
over Nielsen Spirits's use of interlocking double Xs in its mark
ROXX for vodka. 19
R2&
Complaint at 6, Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Nielsen Spirits, Inc., No. 1:15-CV-24022
(S.D. Fla. Oct. 27, 2015).
15. The Westlaw filings for the case include:
(i) Defendants' Motion to Exclude Portions of the Expert Report of Dr. Robert Frank
and Related Testimony and Memorandum in Support, FX Networks, LLC, No.
4:13-CV-02906 (July 14, 2015);
(ii) Defendants' Motion in Limine to Exclude Anonymous Internet Blog Postings and
Memorandum in Support, FXNetworks, LLC, No. 4:13-CV-02906 (July 14, 2015);
(iii) Defendants' Motion to Exclude Evidence Resulting in an Adverse Inference Re-
garding FXs Invocation of the Attorney-Client Privilege and Memorandum in
Support, FXNetworks, LLC, No. 4:13-CV-02906 (July 14, 2015);
(iv) Plaintiffs Motion to Exclude Portions of Ravi Dahr's Expert Report and Testi-
mony, FXNetworks, LLC, No. 4:13-CV-02906 (July 14, 2015);
(v) Defendants' Consolidated Motion to Exclude the Expert Reports and Testimony
of Dr. David Stewart and Dr. James Pomerantz and Memorandum in Support,
FXNetworks, LLC, No. 4:13-CV-02906 (July 14, 2015); and
(vi) Defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss Count V of Plaintiffs Amended Com-
plaint, FXNetworks, LLC, No. 4:13-CV-02906 (Dec. 26, 2013).
16. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. FX Networks, LLC, 39 F. Supp. 3d 868, 871-72 (S.D. Tex.
2014) (holding that Exxon's state law dilution claims were not preempted by Lanham Act
Section 43(c)(6)); Exxon Mobil Corp. v. FX Networks, LLC, No. H-13-2906, 2015 WL
12942049, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 26, 2015) (granting in part and denying in part the Defend-
ants' motion to dismiss Exxon's claim for actual damages).
17. Eriq Gardner, Fox, ExxonMobil Hit Brakes on ='XX" Trademark Dispute,
HOLLYWOOD REP. (Oct. 19, 2015, 3:10 PM), https://www.hollywoodreporter.comlthr-esq/fox-
exxonmobil-hit-brakes-fxx-833113 [http://perma.cc/SH6W-7FSS] (last visited Nov. 2, 2018).
18. See Laurel Brubaker Calkins, Exxon Mobil Settles Logo Trademark Fight with
FXX Network, 90 PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. 3547, 3565 (2015); FXX Schedule, FX,
http://www.fxnetworks.com/fxx [http://perma.ccIEP5T-GPVX] (last visited Nov. 2, 2018).
19. Complaint at 10-11, Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Nielsen Spirits, Inc., No. 1:15-CV-
24022 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 27, 2015).
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On the merits, Exxon's claims against Nielsen Spirits are very
similar to its claims against Fox Networks. 20 While Exxon has reg-
istered the stand-alone double X mark, the double X mark does not
have the strength or instant recognition among consumers that
the Exxon mark has.21 Other well-known companies have used
and continue to use interlocking double Xs, including TJ Maxx. 22
The products at issue, whether gasoline and television networks,
or gasoline and vodka, do not compete and are almost entirely un-
related.
Yet, there was a key difference in the two cases. Fox Networks
had the resources to fight Exxon's claims, but Nielsen Spirits did
not. Because Nielson Spirits is only a small, two-person operation,
the only motion it could afford to file was a motion to dismiss or
alternatively, to transfer the litigation from Florida, where Exxon
filed, to Arizona or California, where Nielsen Spirits did busi-
ness.23 The district judge did not rule on the motion, however, and
less than a year later, in October 2016, the parties settled.24 How-
ever, unlike the Exxon-Fox settlement, the terms of the Exxon-
Nielsen Spirits settlement are not confidential. They are instead
set forth, at least in part, in a consent judgment that the Florida
district court entered. In the consent judgment, the court specifi-
cally ordered Nielsen Spirits to "cease any use of the Interlocking
ROXX VODKA Logos, and any other mark that is confusingly sim-
ilar to the Interlocking X Marks."25 Instead of interlocking double
Xs, the consent judgment allowed Nielsen Spirits to use non-inter-
locking double Xs as shown below:
20. Compare id. at 10-13 (alleging federal trademark infringement, violation of Lan-
ham Act Section 43(a), federal trademark dilution, Florida common law unfair competition,
dilution under Florida state law, unjust enrichment, and refusal of registration), with
Amended Complaint at 10-13, Exxon Mobil Corp. v. FX Networks, LLC, No. 4:13-CV-02906
(S.D. Tex. Dec. 12, 2013) (alleging infringement of registered marks, violation of Lanham
Act Section 43(a), federal trademark dilution, common law unfair competition, dilution un-
der Texas law, unjust enrichment, and refusal of registration).
21. XX, Registration No. 2,305,494; see Expert Report of Professor Ravi Dhar, supra
note 14, at 7-8.
22. See, e.g., T.J. MAXX, Registration No. 1,495,462.
23. Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative Transfer of Venue for Forum Non
Conveniens for Specially Appearing Defendants Pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure 12(b)(2) and 12(b)(3) and Supporting Memorandum of Points and Authorities at 8-9,
16-17, Nielson Spirits, Inc., No. 1:15-CV-24022 (Dec. 10, 2015).
24. Consent Final Judgment at 7, Nielson Spirits, Inc., No. 1:15-CV-24022 (Nov. 8,
2016).
25. Id. at 6.
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Consent Final Judgment at 4-5, Nielson Spirits, Inc., No. 1:15-CV-24022 (Nov. 8, 2016).
In the middle ages and even today in places other than the
United States, it was, and is, not uncommon for the class or wealth
of the respective parties to determine the outcome of a legal dis-
pute. Today, we refer to this approach to dispute resolution as the
rule of man because the rules depend upon the wealth, class, or
status of the man for whom the rules are enforced and/or against
whom the rules are applied. 26 The injustice of this approach to re-
solving disputes is readily apparent and has been well-known for
centuries. Our modern system of dispute resolution is supposed to
be based upon the rule of law. It does not, or at least should not,
depend on the wealth or status of the respective parties. Rather, it
should turn on the merits of the parties' respective positions under
universally applied legal rules. To reflect this, we depict Lady Jus-
tice as wearing a blindfold-not because justice is blind, but be-
cause justice does not and should not turn on the identity of the
parties before her.
Yet, as our tale of two cases illustrates, outcomes today in the
trademark system depend, and sometimes depend almost entirely,
on the respective wealth of the parties. Fox Networks was able to
continue using the interlocking double Xs in its FXX logo not be-
cause it had a stronger case under the applicable principles of
trademark law than Nielsen Spirits. Rather, Fox Network was
able to continue its use because it could afford to litigate, while
Nielsen Spirits could not.
This is injustice of a very fundamental sort. Perversely, this
injustice has arisen because judges, over the years, repeatedly
sought to avoid injustice in the cases that came before them. At
the turn of the twentieth century, trademark law consisted largely
26. See Rene Valladares, The Rule of Law vs. The Rule of Man, 26 NEV. LAW. 36, 36
(2018) (comparing the legal system of Nicaragua where dictators used the legal system to
punish whomever they saw fit to punish with the United States). Some scholars use the
phrase "rule of man" to refer to the discretion inherent in the application of any set of rules
or standards within a rule of law framework, but I am not using that watered-down version
of the concept here. See, e.g., Dean J. Spader, Rule of Law v. Rule of Man: The Search for
the Golden Zigzag Between Conflicting Fundamental Values, 12 J. CRIM. JUST. 379 (1984)
(laying out an analysis of the conflict between law and discretion).
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of a series of simple, black-and-white legal rules. Only inherently
distinctive trademarks could receive protection as trademarks and
only against the use of the same mark on the same product. Inev-
itably, these simple rules yielded outcomes that were unjust.
When they did, judges would sometimes refuse to follow the rule
and would replace a simple rule with a more open-ended standard.
As judges continued to do this, in case after case over the years,
they sharply increased the complexity, uncertainty, and expense
associated with resolving trademark disputes. As a result, trade-
mark law today has become a two-tiered system, in which resolu-
tion of disputes turns on a first and usually decisive question: Can
you afford to litigate?
III. TRADEMARKS AND THE JUDICIAL SEARCH FOR PERFECT
JUSTICE: FROM RULES TO STANDARDS, FROM SIMPLE TO COMPLEX
A. Judging Infringement: From Rule to Standard
Over the course of the twentieth century, courts changed
trademark law's scope of protection. What began as a specific rule
for infringement became an open-ended standard. In the Trade-
mark Acts of 1881 and 1905, Congress defined the scope of trade-
mark protection using the so-called double-identity rule.27 Under
this rule, Congress limited protection to instances in which two
conditions were satisfied. First, a plaintiff had to establish that a
defendant had "reproduce[d], counterfeit[ed], cop[ied] or colorably
imitate[d]" a registered mark. 28 In practice, this limited protection
to a defendant's use of either the same or a nearly identical mark.
Second, a plaintiff further had to show that the defendant had
used the same mark on "merchandise of substantially the same
descriptive properties."29 In practice, this limited protection to a
defendant's use on the same goods. Thus, to demonstrate infringe-
ment, a plaintiff had to satisfy the double-identity rule. Under this
rule, a defendant would infringe only by using: (1) the same mark
(2) on the same goods.
Under this rule, using the same mark on a different product
did not constitute trademark infringement. For example, in 1912,
27. In the relevant provisions, the Acts provide:
Any person who shall reproduce, counterfeit, copy or colorably imitate any trade-
mark registered under this act and affix the same to merchandise of substantially
the same descriptive properties as those described in the registration, shall be liable
to an action on the case for damages for the wrongful use of said trade-mark ....
Act of Mar. 3, 1881, ch. 138, § 7, 21 Stat. 502, 503-04; see also Act of Feb. 20, 1905, ch. 592,
§ 16, 33 Stat. 724, 728 (containing similar language).
28. § 7, 21 Stat. at 503.
29. Id.
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Borden's Condensed Milk, which had long used Borden as the
brand name for its condensed milk, sued another company that
began using the name "Borden's" for ice cream. 30 Although the dis-
trict court granted relief, the Seventh Circuit reversed and re-
jected the claim. 31 The court held that because milk and ice cream
were not competing products, there could be no unfair competi-
tion.32 Recognizing that ice cream and milk did not share "the
same descriptive properties,"33 the plaintiff nevertheless argued
that it should be entitled to relief for two reasons. First, it intended
to enter the ice cream market.3 4 Second, it was selling its con-
densed milk to ice cream manufacturers, and so the markets were
close enough that some ice cream dealers would mistakenly be-
lieve that the plaintiff had made the defendant's product. 35 The
court rejected both arguments, however. With respect to the first,
the court insisted that the law "deals with acts and not inten-
tions." 36 Because the defendant actually began selling ice cream
under the Borden's name first, the defendant held the rights to
that name for ice cream.3 7 The plaintiffs intent to enter that mar-
ket was simply irrelevant.38 With respect to the second, the court
said the specter of confusion was simply too "speculative and re-
mote" to justify relief.39
Just five years later, however, the Second Circuit embraced a
different approach on a similar claim in Aunt Jemima Mills Co. v.
Rigney & Co. 40 In this case, the plaintiff had used the phrase Aunt
Jemima's for self-rising pancake flour for years, when the defend-
ant began using Aunt Jemima's for syrup.41 As the two goods did
not have "the same descriptive properties," the district court dis-
missed the complaint. 42 On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed. 43
30. Borden's Condensed Milk Co. v. Borden Ice Cream Co., 194 F. 554, 554-55 (N.D.
Ill. 1912).
31. Borden Ice Cream Co. v. Borden's Condensed Milk Co., 201 F. 510, 515 (7th Cir.
1912).
32. Id. at 514.
33. § 7, 21 Stat. at 503.
34. Borden, 201 F. at 514-15.
35. Id. at 515.
36. Id. (quoting George v. Smith, 52 F. 830, 832 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1892)).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Aunt Jemima Mills Co. v. Rigney & Co., 247 F. 407 (2d Cir. 1917).
41. Aunt Jemima Mills Co. v. Rigney & Co., 234 F. 804, 805 (E.D.N.Y. 1916), rev'd,
247 F. 407 (2d Cir. 1917).
42. Id.
43. Aunt Jemima Mills, 247 F. at 412.
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Although the court acknowledged the traditional limits of trade-
mark law, it nonetheless felt that the two products were suffi-
ciently related that consumers were likely to believe that the
plaintiff had made the defendant's product. 44 It therefore granted
relief and enjoined the defendant's use.46 As the court explained:
It is said that even a technical trade-mark may be appropri-
ated by any one in any market for goods not in competition
with those of the prior user. This was the view of the court
below in saying that no one wanting syrup could possibly be
made to take flour. But we think that goods, though differ-
ent, may be so related as to fall within the mischief which
equity should prevent. Syrup and flour are both food prod-
ucts, and food products commonly used together. Obviously,
the public, or a large part of it, seeing this trade-mark on a
syrup, would conclude that it was made by the complain-
ant.
46
To be sure, the Aunt Jemima case presented a fairly egregious
set of facts. All of the selling power associated with the Aunt Jem-
ima mark was the result of the plaintiffs efforts; the Aunt Jemima
mark had no intrinsic selling power.47 Moreover, the defendant
had intentionally duplicated not only the wordmark but also the
iconic image of Aunt Jemima, as well as the color and style of the
labeling, as shown below.
44. Id. at 409-10.
45. Id. at 412.
46. Id. at 409-10.
47. Matt Soniak, How Aunt Jemima Changed U.S. Trademark Law, MENTAL FLOSS
(June 15, 2012), http://mentalfloss.com/article/30933how-aunt-jemima-changed-us-trade-
mark-law [http://perma.cc/44KH-7UJE].
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district court dismissed the complaint on the grounds that no rea-
sonable consumer would believe that Vogue magazine had begun
manufacturing the defendant's hats.53 Although the Sixth Circuit
agreed that such confusion as to source was unlikely, it nonethe-
less reversed.5 4 In the Sixth Circuit's view, the defendant's use
would likely lead consumers to believe that the plaintiff had spon-
sored or endorsed the defendant's hats.55 It held that such spon-
sorship confusion was sufficient to sustain the cause of action. 56 As
the court explained:
Plaintiff's magazine is so far an arbiter of style, and the use
of plaintiffs trade-mark upon defendants' hats so far indi-
cates that the hats were at least sponsored and approved by
the plaintiff, that the same considerations which make the
misrepresentation so valuable to defendants make it preg-
nant with peril to plaintiff.5 7
Again, the facts in the case were fairly egregious. The defend-
ant had copied not only the Vogue wordmark but the V-girl mark,
as shown below.
V yE
I S
NEW YORK
Vogue Co. v. Thompson-Hudson Co., 300 F. 509, 510 (6th Cir. 1924).
As the court acknowledged, the word "vogue" alone was nei-
ther arbitrary nor uniquely associated with Vogue magazine at the
time.58 Even then, "vogue" was "approximately synonymous with
'style' or 'fashion."' 59 Given its ordinary descriptive meaning, use
of the wordmark might confuse some consumers, but the court re-
53. Id. ("The District Court thought that, so far as the case counted on unfair compe-
tition, it must be dismissed, because there was no competition between the publishing of
the magazine and the manufacture of hats, and that, so far as it counted on trade-mark
infringement, it failed, because magazines and hats are not articles 'of the same descriptive
qualities."').
54. Id. at 511-12.
55. Id. at 511.
56. Id. at 511-12.
57. Id. at 512.
58. Id. at 511.
59. Id.
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fused to give relief on those grounds. Any confusion that might re-
sult from the use of the word "vogue" was the plaintiffs own fault
for picking, as its trademark, a word with a preexisting descriptive
meaning-an approach that was fairly typical of the manner in
which courts approached claims of unfair competition based upon
use of a descriptive word at the time.6°
With respect to the V-girl design, however, the court saw the
matter differently. The large capital V, with or without the
woman, "has been an individual characteristic of the plaintiff com-
pany in all its publications and advertisements in which it has
used the word 'Vogue."'6 1 While there were minor differences be-
tween the women depicted, in the court's view, "the differences in
the inclosed woman's figure are immaterial, and only emphasize
an obvious intent to leave a loophole of escape, while getting the
full benefit of the copying."62
As the twentieth century wore on, courts continued to expand
the infringement standard. In 1955, the Second Circuit expanded
the infringement standard to encompass confusion arising post-
sale, among onlookers, rather than at the time of purchase by the
purchaser.6 3 In 1968, a federal district court expanded the in-
fringement standard to encompass confusion as to affiliation or as-
sociation, rather than confusion as to source or endorsement.6 4 In
60. As the court explained:
The record informs us that 'Vogue Shops,' selling various kinds of apparel, have
been and are very common throughout the country. Plaintiffs claim of monopoly
along this line logically embraces them all; and though, particularly as to women's
apparel, there is likely to be a considerable element of mistake on the part of pur-
chasers who suppose that the use of the word indicates some connection with the
magazine, it is a mistake for which plaintiff must carry the responsibility, because
it chose as the name of its magazine a word which all are at liberty to use.
Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Mastercrafters Clock & Radio Co. v. Vacheron & Constantin-LeCoultre Watches,
Inc., 221 F.2d 464, 466 (2d Cir. 1955); see also Ferrari S.P.A. v. Roberts, 944 F.2d 1235,
1245-46 (6th Cir. 1991) (holding the cars intended to mimic appearance of Ferraris in-
fringed upon Ferrari's trade dress in its cars even though purchasers not confused); Rolex
Watch U.S.A., Inc. v. Canner, 645 F. Supp. 484, 492-93 (S.D. Fla. 1986) (holding that sale
of low-priced imitation Rolex watches constituted trademark infringement even though
purchasers were not confused).
64. Carling Brewing Co. v. Philip Morris Inc., 297 F. Supp. 1330, 1337-38 (N.D. Ga.
1968). In.an attempt to justify the expansion, the court explained:
Given the general situation where the public is generally unaware of the specific
corporate structure of those whose products it buys, but is aware that corporate
diversification, mergers, acquisitions and operation through subsidiaries is a fact
of life, it is reasonable to believe that the appearance of "Black Label" on cigarettes
could lead to some confusion as to the sponsorship of EITHER or both the ciga-
rettes and the beer. Whether the public concludes (if it really draws a specific
conclusion) that plaintiffs Black Label beer may have become connected with
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1975, the Second Circuit expanded the infringement standard to
encompass initial interest confusion-confusion that initially at-
tracts the attention of consumers to the defendant's goods, even
though it is dispelled before any actual purchase. 65 In the same
year, the Fifth Circuit expanded the infringement standard to cre-
ate a merchandising right for professional, and by extension, am-
ateur sports teams.66 It did so by holding that use of a sports team's
logo on merchandise, or as merchandise, inevitably led consumers
to believe that the team had sponsored or approved the use. 67 In
1977, the Tenth Circuit expanded the infringement standard to
encompass reverse confusion-confusion in which, rather than
mistakenly believing that the plaintiff made the defendant's
goods, consumers mistakenly believe that the defendant made the
plaintiffs goods. 68
As a result of this radical expansion of the infringement
standard, it has become far more difficult to predict how a court
will resolve any given trademark dispute. It has also become far
more expensive to find out. Even in cases, such as our two Exxon
cases, in which the likelihood of any actual confusion seems van-
ishingly small, a defendant has little chance of avoiding trial
through a motion to dismiss or summary judgment motion. As the
infringement standard expanded, all a plaintiff had to show was
that a relatively small percentage, 10% or so, of consumers be-
lieved that the plaintiff had given permission for, or '[went] along'
Philip Morris, or that Carling may now be putting out cigarettes is immaterial.
Id. at 1337.
65. Grotrian, Helfferich, Schulz, Th. Steinweg Nachf. v. Steinway & Sons, 523 F.2d
1331, 1341-42 (2d Cir. 1975).
66. Bos. Profl Hockey Ass'n v. Dall. Cap & Emblem Mfg., Inc., 510 F.2d 1004, 1012
(5th Cir. 1975); see also Warner Bros., Inc. v. Gay Toys, Inc., 658 F.2d 76, 79 (2d Cir. 1981)
(recognizing a similar merchandising right for popular television shows). But see Int'l Order
of Job's Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co., 633 F.2d 912, 920 (9th Cir. 1980) (rejecting mer-
chandising right for fraternal organization).
67. Bos. Prop Hockey Ass'n, 510 F.2d at 1012 ("The confusion or deceit requirement
is met by the fact that the defendant duplicated the protected trademarks and sold them to
the public knowing that the public would identify them as being the teams' trademarks.
The certain knowledge of the buyer that the source and origin of the trademark symbols
were in plaintiffs satisfies the requirement of the act."); see also Ky. Fried Chicken Corp. v.
Diversified Packaging Corp., 549 F.2d 368, 389 (5th Cir. 1977) ("Boston Hockey also reiter-
ated our unbroken insistence on a showing of confusion, and we believe that our opinion
must be read in that context. Under the circumstances there-involving sales to the con-
suming public of products bearing trademarks universally associated with Boston
Hockey-the fact that the buyers knew the symbols originated with Boston Hockey sup-
ported the inescapable inference that many would believe that the product itself originated
with or was somehow endorsed by Boston Hockey.").
68. Big 0 Tire Dealers, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 561 F.2d 1365, 1371-72
(10th Cir. 1977) (applying Colorado law). Applying Indiana law, the Seventh Circuit re-
jected the reverse confusion theory just nine years previously. Westward Coach Mfg. Co. v.
Ford Motor Co., 388 F.2d 627, 633-34 (7th Cir. 1968).
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with,"69 the defendant's use to establish a triable claim of infringe-
ment.
As the expansion took hold, cases of seeming injustice began
to arise on the other side. Where the double identity rule created
injustice by allowing unscrupulous defendants to cozy right up to
the line, yet still evade infringement, the broader likelihood-of-
confusion standard created injustice by allowing unscrupulous
plaintiffs to assert claims that sought to limit fair competition, free
speech, and other socially valued interests. As it did, courts cre-
ated new trademark law in yet another misguided attempt to
achieve justice in the cases before them.
B. Consequences of a Broad and Uncertain Standard for
Infringement: The Resulting Need for Exceptions
As the expanded infringement standard began to take hold in
the late twentieth century, courts adopted various strategies to
limit the injustice the broader infringement standard that they
had made up inevitably created. In some cases, courts pretended
that factual differences between nearly identical cases justified
differing outcomes. For example, the Boston Athletic Association
pursued claims against both an unauthorized television broadcast
of the Boston Marathon and unauthorized merchandise bearing
the words "Boston Marathon." Without any real evidentiary basis
for distinguishing the two cases, the court found that consumers
would infer sponsorship from the use of the words "Boston Mara-
thon" on the unauthorized t-shirts but not on the television broad-
cast.70 Similarly, and again without any real evidentiary basis,
courts found that consumers would infer sponsorship for athletic
team emblems and for vehicles made popular by television pro-
grams but not for the emblems of fraternal organizations. 71 In oth-
ers, they simply refused to apply some of the more expansive forms
69. See Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397, 400 (8th Cir. 1987) ('The
District Court acknowledged that there may be some ambiguity in the 'goes along' question
used in the survey, but found the survey as a whole 'credible evidence of a likelihood of
confusion as to source or sponsorship."' (citation omitted)).
70. Compare WCVB-TV v. Bos. Athletic Ass'n, 926 F.2d 42, 43-44 (1st Cir. 1991) (af-
firming district court and denying Boston Athletic Association an injunction against unau-
thorized use of its Boston Marathon mark on an unauthorized television broadcast of the
race), with Bos. Athletic Ass'n. v. Sullivan, 867 F.2d 22, 23-24 (1st Cir. 1987) (reversing
district court decision and granting Boston Athletic Association an injunction against un-
authorized use of its Boston Marathon mark on t-shirts).
71. See Bos. Prof'l Hockey Ass'n, 510 F.2d at 1012, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 868 (1975)
(recognizing a merchandising right for professional sports teams); Warner Bros., 658 F.2d
at 79 (recognizing a similar merchandising right for popular television shows). But see Int'l
Order of Job's Daughters, 633 F.2d at 920 (rejecting merchandising right for a fraternal
organization).
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of the infringement standard to particular cases-an approach
courts continue to use today.72
Eventually, however, the overbroad and uncertain reach of
the implied endorsement theory forced courts to limit its reach ex-
pressly, at least for particular defendants in particular situations.
The Second Circuit was the first to adopt such an express limita-
tion. In Rogers v. Grimaldi, Ginger Rogers sued the producers and
distributors of a movie, Ginger and Fred.73 As the court noted, the
movie "only obliquely relates to Rogers and Astaire."74 Rather,
than tell the story of Ginger Rogers and Fred Astaire, "[t]he film
tells the story of two fictional Italian cabaret performers, Pippo
and Amelia, who, in their heyday, imitated Rogers and Astaire and
became known in Italy as 'Ginger and Fred."'75 Rogers sued, alleg-
ing that the use of her name in the title would lead consumers to
infer that she had endorsed the movie.76 To support her claim, Rog-
ers had a survey that showed that substantially more than the
requisite 10% of consumers believed that Rogers was involved with
making the film. 77 Ordinarily, such a survey would have been suf-
ficient to create a triable issue on sponsorship or endorsement con-
fusion. But the court refused to follow the ordinary approach.
Instead, the court held that trademark and unfair competition
law would treat film titles differently. 78 To reach this conclusion,
the court began with the undeniable point that films and movies
are protected by the First Amendment's free speech guarantees. 79
The court then took the small step from the film to its title: "Titles,
like the artistic works they identify, are of a hybrid nature, com-
bining artistic expression and commercial promotion."80 Because
of that expressive character, titles "require[] more protection than
the labeling of ordinary commercial products."81 In the court's
view, for titles, the public interest in avoiding consumer confusion
must be balanced against the First Amendment interest in free
expression.8 2 Rather than allow an implication or inference of
72. See, e.g., Gibson Guitar Corp. v. Paul Reed Smith Guitars, LP, 423 F.3d 539,
550-53 (6th Cir. 2005) (refusing to apply initial interest confusion or post-sale confusion
theories to product design trade dress claim over guitar design).
73. 875 F.2d 994, 996 (2d Cir. 1989).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 996-97.
76. Id. at 997.
77. Id. at 1001 n.8.
78. Id. at 1000.
79. Id. at 997-98.
80. Id. at 998.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 999.
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sponsorship from the mere use of a word, name, or trademark in a
title, the court held that use of Roger's name in the movie title
would be actionable if and only if either: (1) the title had no artistic
relevance to the film; or (2) the title expressly misleads as to source
or sponsorship.8 3 Finding neither to be the case, the court rejected
Rogers' claims as a matter of law.84
Three years later, the Ninth Circuit confronted a similar im-
plied endorsement claim and created the so-called nominative fair
use doctrine to narrow the reach for such claims.8 5 In New Kids on
the Block v. News America Publishing, the band, the New Kids on
the Block, pursued claims against two newspapers that ran polls
about the New Kids.8 6 To respond to the polls, readers had to call
1-900 numbers, and for those calls, survey participants were
charged.8 7 The New Kids asserted an implied endorsement theory
of confusion, alleging that consumers would believe that the New
Kids had endorsed, sponsored, given permission, or merely went
along with the polls.88 Although the New Kids did not present a
survey, under the implied endorsement theory of confusion, this
was an entirely viable claim.
Yet, the Ninth Circuit rejected it as a matter of law.8 9 While
the district court, following the lead of the Rogers court, seized on
the special protections afforded traditional press activities under
the First Amendment to exonerate the defendants, the Ninth Cir-
cuit adopted a different approach.90 Rather than relying on the
First Amendment directly, or following the Second Circuit's Rogers
approach, the Ninth Circuit panel recognized a new defense or doc-
trine that it called nominative fair use.91 In establishing this de-
fense or doctrine, the panel began by identifying a trio of earlier
cases in which courts had ruled in favor of defendants on implied
endorsement theories.9 2 In each of these three cases, the court had
found a defendant, who admittedly used the plaintiffs trademark
without permission, not liable for trademark infringement. 93 In
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1001-02.
85. New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ'g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 308 (9th Cir. 1992).
86. Id. at 304.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 308.
89. Id. at 309.
90. Id. at 305, 308.
91. Id. at 308.
92. Id. at 307.
93. Id. (first citing Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Church, 411 F.2d 350 (9th
Cir. 1969); then citing WCVB-TV v. Bos. Athletic Ass'n, 926 F.2d 42 (1st Cir. 1991);
and then citing Smith v. Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1968)).
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the first, an independent repair shop was allowed to advertise that
it repaired Volkswagen vehicles, even though it was not author-
ized by or affiliated with Volkswagen.94 In the second, a television
station was allowed to label its unauthorized broadcast of the Bos-
ton Marathon as a broadcast of the Boston Marathon. 95 In the
third, a competitor who made similar-smelling imitations of popu-
lar perfumes was allowed to advertise that its perfume smelled
like Chanel No. 5.96 These cases, in the New Kids court's view, "are
best understood as involving a non-trademark use of a mark-a
use to which the infringement laws simply do not apply."97
Had the Ninth Circuit stopped there, perhaps we could have
developed a workable and general limitation on the scope of the
implied endorsement theory. Unfortunately, the court did not stop
there. Instead of relying on a non-trademark use rule, the New
Kids court created a nominative fair use defense or doctrine. For
the use to qualify as a non-infringing nominative use, the court
identified three factors that must be present:
First, the product or service in question must be one not
readily identifiable without use of the trademark; second,
only so much of the mark or marks may be used as is reason-
ably necessary to identify the product or service; and third,
the user must do nothing that would, in conjunction with the
mark, suggest sponsorship or endorsement by the trademark
holder.98
While the doctrine has a number of difficulties and ambigui-
ties, perhaps the central difficulty is factor three: "the user must
do nothing that would.., suggest sponsorship." 99 The central dif-
ficulty, of course, is that as the implied endorsement theory devel-
oped, it was the use of the mark alone that implied or suggested
sponsorship or endorsement. To get around this, the court simply
asserted that such implication or suggestion was not present in a
nominative fair use case: "[S]uch use is fair because it does not
imply sponsorship or endorsement by the trademark holder." 100
The New Kids court offered no surveys or other evidence to support
this factual assertion. Instead, the New Kids court cited Justice
94. Volkswagenwerk, 411 F.2d at 351-52.
95. WCVB-TV, 926 F.2d at 44.
96. Chanel, 402 F.2d at 569 ('We are satisfied, therefore, that both authority and
reason require a holding that in the absence of misrepresentation or confusion as to source
or sponsorship a seller in promoting his own goods may use the trademark of another to
identify the latter's goods.').
97. New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ'g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 307 (9th Cir. 1992).
98. Id. at 308.
99. Id.
100. Id.
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Holmes's opinion in Prestonettes, Inc. v. Coty: 'When the mark is
used in a way that does not deceive the public we see no such sanc-
tity in the word as to prevent its being used to tell the truth."10 1
Unfortunately, the Court's statement in Prestonettes, Inc. does not
support the proposition that the New Kids court is asserting. Jus-
tice Holmes was not addressing whether an implication or infer-
ence of sponsorship does or does not arise. Rather, Justice Holmes
was stating that such implication or inference is irrelevant if the
use of the word is accurate and in that sense, truthful.10 2 As we
saw in the Vogue hat case, if the use is accurate, any confusion
that may result from a defendant's use of a descriptive word is not
the fault of the defendant, but of the plaintiff for picking a descrip-
tive word as its trademark. 103 Thus, at the time he wrote the deci-
sion, Justice Holmes was not saying that there was no confusion.
He was saying that so long as the use was truthful, any confusion
that might result was not actionable.10 4
In any event, whatever the weaknesses in its reasoning, the
New Kids court's nominative fair use doctrine, along with the
Rogers rule, might seem to re-instill some rule-like clarity into
trademark law. Unfortunately, that has not proven to be the case.
The other circuits have not all embraced these doctrines, and when
they have, they have not adopted identical interpretations.1 0 5 Be-
yond movie titles, the reach of the Rogers rule remains unclear.
With respect to the nominative fair use doctrine, the doctrine, by
its express terms, includes considerable uncertainty as to how
much use goes beyond what is reasonably necessary and exactly
what, beyond mere use of the mark itself, constitutes "doing some-
thing" to suggest sponsorship or endorsement. Rather than sim-
plify the issue, the availability of these, and other similar defenses,
has also increased the cost and uncertainty of trademark litigation
for the vast majority of litigants.10 6
IV. TRADEMARK LAW: A NEW WRINKLE ON THE
RULES-STANDARDS DEBATE
Over the course of the twentieth century, the scope of trade-
mark protection evolved from a set of narrow and quite specific
legal rules into a broad and general standard of infringement-
101. Id. (quoting Prestonettes, Inc. v. Coty, 264 U.S. 359, 368 (1924)).
102. Prestonettes, 264 U.S. at 368.
103. See Vogue Co. v. Thompson-Hudson Co., 300 F. 509, 511 (6th Cir. 1924).
104. Prestonettes, 264 U.S. at 368-69.
105. See William McGeveran, The Trademark Fair Use Reform Act, 90 B.U. L. REV.
2267, 2301 (2010).
106. See id. at 2284.
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counterbalanced to some extent by judicial creation of limitations
and exceptions for specific uses by specific defendants in specific
cases. At a broad level, we can characterize this evolution as one
from a set of rules that defined the scope of trademark protection
to a set of standards. Put in those terms, the trade-offs between
rules and standards are well-known and have been extensively ex-
plored. Rules are certain and consistent, entail less judicial discre-
tion, and are less expensive to administer but have potentially
higher error costs. 10 7 Standards are less certain and less con-
sistent, entail more judicial discretion, and are more expensive to
administer but have, at least in theory, lower error costs.108
We can illustrate parts of this trade-off using a graphical de-
piction of all possible trademark cases. Along the horizontal axis,
we chart the cumulative percentage of the distribution of potential
trademark disputes from 0% to 100%. On the vertical axis, we
have the percentage chance that enjoining the conduct will in-
crease social welfare (or whatever measure of justice you would
like to use). Figure 1 depicts the result.
Figure 1. Cumulative Distribution of All Potential Trademark Claims
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At each end of Figure 1, we have paradigmatic cases of fair
and unfair competition. Thus, on the far-left end of the distribu-
tion, we have the paradigmatic case of fair competition. Such a
case would include, for example, instances in which competitors
are using different trademarks, such as Coke and Pepsi, for the
107. See id. at 2290-91.
108. See id.
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same cola product.109 For such a paradigmatic case of fair compe-
tition, there is no chance that prohibiting the selling of Pepsi Cola
would increase social welfare. It would merely reduce competition
without materially reducing consumer confusion in the market-
place. While it would undoubtedly increase Coca-Cola's revenue
and profit to prohibit such fair competition, doing so would impose
a larger welfare loss on consumers. It would, therefore, lead to a
net reduction in social welfare. For that reason, there is a 0%
chance that enjoining the sale of Pepsi Cola would increase social
welfare. For cases at this end of the spectrum, as Figure 1 reflects,
there is a 0% chance that the plaintiff should prevail.
On the far-right end of the distribution, we have the paradig-
matic case of unfair competition. Such a case would include, for
example, classic instances of true counterfeiting. "True" counter-
feiting includes only those cases in which the consumer pays full
price and believes that he or she is buying the authentic good but
is unknowingly getting an inferior imitation instead. 110 Defined in
this way, true counterfeiting, because it involves actual deception,
almost necessarily reduces social welfare. For cases at this end of
the spectrum, there is a 100% chance that the plaintiff should pre-
vail.
At each end, for the paradigmatic cases of either fair or unfair
competition, a fully informed welfare analysis suggests that a
plaintiff should have either a 0 or a 100% chance of prevailing. In
between these two paradigmatic cases, we have a range of dis-
putes. As we move from the left end to the right, we move towards
cases where the competition is increasingly unfair. The lower
black triangle depicts those cases where a fully informed welfare
analysis establishes that a plaintiff should prevail. The upper
white triangle, on the other hand, depicts those cases where a fully
informed welfare analysis establishes that a plaintiff should lose.
As we move from the paradigmatic case of fair competition to the
paradigmatic case of unfair competition, the chance that a plaintiff
should prevail rises steadily, and, in linear fashion,1 ' from 0% to
109. I understand the argument that Coke and Pepsi are not the same product. See
Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Trademark Monopolies, 48 EMORY L.J. 367, 424-25 (1999); see also
Mark A- Lemley & Mark P. McKenna, Owning Mark(et)s, 109 MICH. L. REV. 137, 176
(2010).
110. Cases in which the consumer knows that he or she is buying a fake are not by this
definition "true" counterfeiting. I recognize that courts today routinely label such known
fakes as counterfeits. See, e.g., United States v. Hon, 904 F.2d 803, 804-05 (2d Cir. 2012).
Because the welfare analysis for sales of lower-priced known fakes is different from the
welfare analysis of true counterfeiting, I distinguish the two activities.
111. I have assumed a linear increase in the chance of success, but that is not neces-
sary for the analysis.
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100%.
Figure 1 assumes that we have limited information and thus
cannot conduct a fully informed welfare analysis for each individ-
ual case. Thus, a government regulator may know the distribution
of potential disputes (along the X-axis) but have no ability to dif-
ferentiate between the cases at any given point along the distribu-
tion where enjoining the defendant's conduct will increase social
welfare from those where it will reduce social welfare (in other
words, where a case falls on the Y-axis). With limited information,
the best the regulator can do is to group alike cases together; she
cannot, however, separate those similar cases into ones in which
enjoining the defendant's conduct at issue would increase social
welfare from those in which enjoining the defendant's conduct
would reduce social welfare. Thus, the regulator can determine
that a case falls at the fiftieth percentile along the x-axis. The reg-
ulator cannot determine, however, whether the particular case at
issue falls within the 50% of cases at that point where a fully in-
formed social welfare analysis would establish that enjoining the
conduct is desirable or the 50% of cases at that point where a fully
informed social welfare analysis would establish that enjoining the
conduct is undesirable. Given these assumptions, the optimal ap-
proach for the regulator would be to adopt a rule that falls in the
middle. The rule would declare as unfair all cases to the right of
the rule in the distribution of cases and declare as fair all cases
falling to the left of the rule in the distribution of cases. Figure 2
illustrates such an approach.
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Figure 2. A Rule-Based Approach
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While drawing a line in the middle may seem simplistic, as
Figure 2 illustrates, under our assumptions, it reaches the right
outcome 75% of the time. In the other 25%, the legal system
reaches the wrong outcome. These mistakes are divided evenly be-
tween: (a) Type I errors in which a plaintiff wins under the rule,
but a fully informed social welfare analysis establishes that the
plaintiff should lose; and (b) Type II errors in which a plaintiff
loses under the rule, but a fully informed social welfare analysis
establishes that the plaintiff should win.
The perceived advantage of a standards-based approach is
that it can reduce this error rate. In theory, if we can devise a
standard that perfectly matches the outcome of a fully informed
welfare analysis, a standards-based approach can reach the right
outcome in every case. The error rate, whether of Type I or Type
II errors, drops to zero. Figure 3 illustrates this theoretical
possibility.
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Figure 3. A Standard-Based Approach: In Theory
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For the ideal standard depicted in Figure 3, there is no
separate line for the legal standard used to resolve trademark
disputes. Rather, it maps exactly on the line between the black and
white triangles. This is the same line that precisely separates
those cases in which a fully informed social welfare analysis
establishes that a plaintiff should lose from those in which such
an analysis establishes that a plaintiff should win. Under such an
ideal standard, the standards-based approach resolves every case
correctly. The error rate falls to zero.
Of course, given current technology and inevitable human
fallibility, such an approach remains only a theoretical ideal.
Nevertheless, to the extent that a standards-based approach can
reduce the error rate compared with a rules-based approach, it
becomes, in the traditional analysis, a question of balancing the
welfare gains from reducing the error rate against the increased
costs, primarily administrative, of the standards-based approach.
In trademark law, the shift from simple rules to complex and
uncertain standards that we have seen over the last hundred years
has sharply increased the administrative costs associated with
litigating a trademark dispute.112 For the parties themselves, the
AIPLA estimated in 2015 that a party will spend, on average,
112. See McGeveran, supra note 105, at 2275-76.
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$325,000 through trial in trademark litigation if the amount in
controversy in the litigation is less than $1,000,000.113 As the
amount in controversy increases, the average cost increases as
well. When the value of the disputed mark exceeds $25,000,000,
the average cost to each party increases to $1,600,000 million. 114
For many small businesses, even the lower of these two amounts
likely remains beyond their reach.
In trademark disputes, the amount in controversy turns on
the value of the disputed mark. 115 Damages are seldom awarded
in trademark litigation."6 Usually what is at stake is whether a
defendant may continue to use the trademark at issue or must
cease. As a result, the amount in controversy is usually the net
present value of the expected marginal rents a party will capture
if it prevails. If the plaintiff prevails, the defendant will have to
cease competing unfairly. The plaintiff will, therefore, capture
additional sales and may have a higher profit margin. If the
plaintiff loses, the defendant will get to continue competing. In
either case, the prevailing party will capture some, perhaps
considerable, additional rents. These additional rents are, in the
usual claim of trademark infringement, the amount in controversy
in the litigation.
For a profit-maximizing plaintiff, and ignoring reputational,
repeat-player concerns, the plaintiff will sue a defendant for
trademark infringement if:
Vp=RSr-C>0 (1)
In equation (1), Vp is the net value of pursuing litigation to the
plaintiff, R is the plaintiffs chance of success, Sp is the net present
value of the expected additional rents or surplus that the plaintiff
will earn if it prevails, and C is the cost of the litigation. So long
as Vp is greater than zero, a rational, profit-maximizing plaintiff
will sue.
113. AIPLA, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 2015, at 38 (2015),
http://files.ctctcdn.com/e79ee274201lb6ced6c3-dlee-4ee7-9873-352dbe08d8fd.pdf [http://
perma.cc/8UUL-BNE8].
114. Id. at 39.
115. See generally Michael J. Freno, Trademark Valuation: Preserving Brand Equity,
97 TRADEMARK REP. 1055 (2007).
116. See, e.g., Fishman Transducers, Inc. v. Paul, 684 F.3d 187, 194 (1st Cir. 2012)
("[D]amages awards turn out to be comparatively rare in trademark cases primarily, it ap-
pears, because of the difficulty of proving them.") (citing Freno, supra note 115, at
1062-63). The two exceptions to this general rule are (1) reverse confusion and (2) counter-
feiting cases.
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Similarly, for a profit-maximizing defendant and again, ignor-
ing reputational, repeat-player concerns, the defendant will en-
gage in litigation to defend its right to use a trademark if:
Vd=(1-R) Sd-C>O (2)
In equation (2), Vd is the net value of pursuing litigation to
the defendant, (1-R) is the defendant's chance of success, Sd is the
net present value of the expected additional rents or surplus that
the defendant will earn if it prevails, and C is the cost of the liti-
gation. 117 So long as Vd is greater than zero, a rational, profit-max-
imizing defendant will fight, rather than concede.
Switching from rules to standards changes two key variables
in these equations. First, it introduces uncertainty into the plain-
tiffs chance of success. With a rule, R will often be either one or
zero, and which one it is will usually be plain to both parties from
the outset. Thus, if we had retained the double identity rule for
infringement, the chance that Exxon could succeed on its claims
that Roxx vodka infringed its interlocking double X trademark for
gasoline would be essentially zero. Vodka does not compete with
gasoline or other petrochemical products. If Exxon threatened to
sue Nielsen Spirits over Roxx vodka, both sides would know it was
an empty threat under the double-identity rule. However, because
courts have replaced the double-identity rule with the likelihood-
of-confusion standard, Exxon has some chance of success. It might
be a relatively small chance of success, to the extent that Exxon's
claims are relatively weak even under the likelihood-of-confusion
standard, but Exxon's chance of success is no longer zero.
Second, the switch from rules to standards also radically in-
creases the cost of testing a plaintiffs claim of infringement.
Again, using the Roxx vodka example, if we had retained the dou-
ble identity rule for infringement, a simple, and relatively inex-
pensive motion to dismiss would have been sufficient to resolve the
case. In contrast, under today's standards for the likelihood of con-
fusion or dilution, there was no simple and inexpensive path to
judicial resolution. Perhaps, Nielsen Spirits could prevail on a
summary judgment motion, but even that would require Nielsen
Spirits to cover the substantial expenses associated with discov-
ery.118 Even after discovery though, there is no guarantee that the
117. Note that the costs of litigation to the two parties need not be the same. I have
assumed that the costs are the same to simplify the model.
118. Depending on the amount in controversy, the 2015 AIPLA survey reported aver-
age trademark litigation costs through the end of discovery of $150,000 to $900,000. AIPLA,
supra note 113, at 38-39.
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court would grant the summary judgment motion. With the re-
sources at its disposal, Exxon can hire experts and perform re-
peated surveys. With sufficient resources, sooner or later, one of
those surveys will yield results sufficient to create a genuine dis-
pute as to whether the interlocking double Xs in Roxx created a
likelihood of confusion or a likelihood of dilution with respect to
Exxon's interlocking double X mark. Had the parties not settled,
the case might well have gone to trial.
If we take $400,000 as the costs of defense for Nielsen Spirits
and estimate that Exxon has only a 25% chance of success, then
under equation (2), the net present value of the expected rents, Sd,
from continuing to use the interlocking double Xs in Roxx vodka
must be at least $500,000 to justify Nielsen Spirits defending
against Exxon's claims. Keep in mind that the $500,000 net pre-
sent value must reflect both: (1) rents, not revenue, from continued
use of the mark and (2) marginal, additional rents from using Roxx
with the interlocking double Xs over and above the rents from us-
ing a non-infringing version of Roxx.
Moreover, even if Nielsen Spirits expected to capture surplus,
Sd, in excess of $500,000, and could justify defending itself,
Exxon's ability to threaten or begin litigation sharply reduces the
amount Exxon will have to pay Nielsen Spirits to persuade Nielsen
Spirits to switch to a non-infringing alternative. For example, as-
sume that Nielsen Spirits estimates that it will capture $1 million
in surplus, Sd, from continuing to use the Roxx mark with the in-
terlocking double Xs, over and above the net present value of rents
it would capture with a non-infringing version of Roxx. In the ab-
sence of a threat of litigation, Nielsen Spirits would willingly "sell"
its right to use the Roxx mark with interlocking Xs to Exxon for
any sum in excess of $1 million. However, this price drops sharply
if Exxon can plausibly threaten suit. With an expected defense cost
of $400,000 and an 80% chance of prevailing, the value to Nielsen
Spirits of litigating in equation (2) is positive, specifically
$400,000. So, Nielsen Spirits would be prepared to defend its
rights. Nevertheless, under these assumptions, Nielsen Spirits
would be willing to settle and give up its right to continue using
Roxx with the interlocking Xs if Exxon were to offer Nielsen Spir-
its more than the $400,000 as compensation for switching to a non-
infringing alternative. The greater ability to threaten suit under
today's standards-based trademark law sharply reduces-by
60%-the amount Exxon has to pay to persuade Nielsen Spirits to
switch. 119
119. It also provides Exxon with a lever to avoid paying potential defendants who
adopt interlocking double X marks in an attempt to hold up Exxon.
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Thus, the judicial switch from relatively simple rules to more
complex, open-ended standards in trademark laws imposes two
forms of injustice on potential trademark parties. First, the high
administrative cost and uncertainty associated with resolving dis-
putes through today's more complex, standards-based trademark
system mean many small businesses cannot afford to participate
in the system at all. When their use of a particular mark is chal-
lenged or their attempt to register their own mark is opposed, the
only path they can afford is to concede. Second, for the somewhat
larger, mid-sized businesses, who can potentially afford litigation,
the high administrative cost and uncertainty put them in a situa-
tion in which it is nevertheless rational to compromise and sell
their rights at a discount.
As a result, rather than achieve the optimal justice Figure 3
depicts, using standards to resolve trademark disputes creates a
two-tiered system. When a wealthy firm confronts another
wealthy firm, and both can afford to litigate, the system produces
reasonably sensible outcomes. However, when a wealthy firm con-
fronts a firm that cannot afford to litigate, the wealthy firm auto-
matically wins. Instead of the optimal justice Figure 3 depicts, us-
ing standards to resolve trademark disputes in the lower tier
produces injustice. In the lower tier, where the wealthy party is
the plaintiff, as in the Roxx vodka dispute, the trademark system
produces results that favor the plaintiff almost without regard to
the underlying merits of the claim. Figure 4 illustrates one possi-
ble distribution of results for wealthy plaintiff, poor defendant
cases in our more expensive and uncertain standards-based trade-
mark system.120
120. For purposes of Figure 4, I have assumed that a poor defendant can afford to
litigate only if it has more than an 80% chance of prevailing.
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Figure 4. A Standard-Based Approach: Wealthy Plaintiff, Poor Defendant
1
0.9 Plaintiff Plaintiff Type I Errors:
loses wins Bullying0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
0.00 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 1.00
As compared to the optimal justice of a standards-based ap-
proach that Figure 3 depicts, the justice that a standards-based
approach achieves in Figure 4 is far less optimal. Rather than an
error rate of zero, as in the optimal case, or even the error rate of
25% under a simple rules-based approach, the error rate in Figure
4 increases to 32%. All of the errors become Type I. In 32% of the
potential trademark cases, plaintiffs that should lose under a fully
informed social welfare analysis will nevertheless prevail because
they are better able to afford litigation.
When the plaintiff is poor and the defendant wealthy, on the
other hand, the trademark system produces results that favor the
defendant, again almost without regard to the underlying merits
of the defendant's position.121 Figure 5 illustrates one possible dis-
tribution of results in poor-plaintiff, wealthy-defendant cases in
121. Professor Bob Bone has argued that the expanded infringement standard can be
justified as a way of minimizing enforcement costs. Robert G. Bone, Enforcement Costs and
Trademark Puzzles, 90 VA. L. REv. 2099, 2139 (2004). While I have a number of difficulties
with his argument, my principal disagreement is this: Under any given trademark infringe-
ment standard or rule, some entities will over-enforce their trademark rights, relative to
the socially optimal level; others will under-enforce. Expanding the infringement standard
does not solve this under- and over-enforcement imbalance; it exacerbates it. As the in-
fringement standard expanded, entities that would already have over-enforced their trade-
mark rights did so even more. Entities that would have under-enforced their trademark
rights, on the other hand, under-enforced even more. Take dilution, for example, or the
strength of the mark factor under the likelihood-of-confusion test; both of these make it
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our more expensive and uncertain standards-based trademark
system. 122
Figure 5. A Standard-Based Approach: Poor Plaintiff, Wealthy Defendant
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As in Figure 4, the justice Figure 5 depicts is once again less
than optimal. Rather than the zero error rate of Figure 3 or even
the 25% error rate of a simple rules-based approach, the error rate
is once again 32%. In this situation, however, all errors are Type
II. In 32% of the potential trademark disputes, a plaintiff that
should prevail under a fully informed welfare analysis will
nevertheless lose because they are less able to afford the costs of
litigation.
V. ACHIEVING JUSTICE FOR MOST IN TRADEMARK LAW
The increasingly complex trademark law that courts have cre-
ated may yield more perfect justice for the increasingly small num-
ber of businesses that can afford to participate in it. But that more
easier for entities with famous or strong marks to bring infringement actions. But these are
also the same entities that are likely to over-enforce their trademark rights in any event.
Moreover, as the infringement standard expanded, courts crafted exceptions and limita-
tions. These made it more difficult and expensive for the owners of weak marks to enforce
their rights even against, what would otherwise have been, straightforward acts of infringe-
ment.
122. For purposes of Figure 5, 1 have assumed that a poor plaintiff can afford to litigate
only if it has more than an 80% chance of prevailing.
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perfect trademark justice for the very few comes at the cost of no
trademark justice at all for the many. A solution will not be easy,
however. While there are a number of approaches that might help
address this issue, including fee shifting 123 or a more extensive
laundry list of defenses, 124 my preferred solution involves two
steps. First, we need to return to a system of simpler rules, includ-
ing the double identity rule for infringement, in trademark law.
Second, we should rely more on the federal registration process as
a less expensive alternative to litigation to resolve trademark dis-
putes. 125
With respect to the first suggestion, compared to the simpler
rule of double identity, today's far more complex likelihood-of-con-
fusion standard generates little welfare gain even when both par-
ties can afford to litigate. Even in the most sympathetic case for
expanding protection beyond the double-identity rule, such as the
Aunt Jemima case, the welfare gains from expanding protection
are trivial, if not entirely imaginary. Had the defendant offered
the same mark on the same product, consumers would be unable
to distinguish the two products. As a result, they would necessarily
associate any dissatisfaction with the defendant's product with the
plaintiff. In contrast, when the products are different, consumers
can readily separate the two. If they like the syrup, they can con-
tinue to buy it. If not, then they will not. But as marketing re-
search has shown, there is no evidence that their satisfaction or
dissatisfaction with the defendant's syrup will influence consum-
ers' decisions to buy or not buy the plaintiffs pancake mix. 26
I recognize the perception of unfairness that the defendant's
free riding in the Aunt Jemima case generates. Yet, at the same
time, consumers can more readily adapt to and mitigate the social
123. I explore fee shifting and some additional alternatives in a separate article. See
generally Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Trademark's Judicial De-Evolution: Why Courts Get Trade-
mark Cases Wrong Repeatedly, 106 CAL. L. REV. 1195 (2018) (cited at the outset of this
Article in the star note).
124. See, e.g., McGeveran, supra note 105, at 2303-17 (proposing safe harbors to pro-
tect uses of trademarks).
125. For a similar conclusion on both returning to the double identity standard and
relying on the registration process to reduce trademark litigation, see Rebecca Tushnet,
Registering Disagreement: Registration in Modern American Trademark Law, 130 HARV. L.
REV. 867, 932-34, 936-38 (2017).
126. See Rebecca Tushnet, Gone in Sixty Milliseconds: Trademark Law and Cognitive
Science, 86 TEX. L. REV. 507, 543-44 (2008) ('That brand-extension research suggests that
dilution by tarnishment through the use of a similar mark on a shoddy product is unlikely
in the absence of source confusion because consumers have robust mental concepts of strong
brands. If consumers are given a reason to distinguish an authorized extension or co-
branded product from the core brand-for example, a name like Courtyard by Marriott in-
stead of Marriott or Coke BlaK instead of Coke-they will do so, and negative opinions
about the extension will not return to harm opinions of the core brand.").
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costs of narrow trademark protection. They can simply refuse to
extend positive associations from one branded product to other
goods with a similar name. If they make a mistake and do so from
time to time, that mistake would impose only a one-time social
cost. In contrast, as trademark protection has expanded and be-
come more complex, brands have become their own markets. 127 For
would-be entrants, alternative brand designations have become
difficult to find.128 These lead inevitably to higher prices and re-
duced choice for consumers. In the face of these social costs, con-
sumers have no choice but to pay.
Moreover, even if we assume arguendo that trademark's more
complicated standards generate some welfare gains in some cases,
the price of excluding wholesale, smaller entities and new entrants
from the trademark system has become too high a price to pay.
With respect to the second suggestion, the trademark regis-
tration process is not a full substitute for trademark infringement
and unfair competition litigation, but it can often serve as a less
expensive alternative. 129 Until recently, the ability to register a
trademark on the principal register and to use the mark in com-
merce were entirely separate issues. Whether an entity could or
could not register a mark had no or very little effect on whether
the entity could use the mark in trade. However, in its 2015 B &
B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Industries, Inc. decision, the Court
sharply narrowed this separation.1 30
In B & B Hardware, the Court held that the Trademark Trial
and Appeal Board (TTAB) resolution of opposition proceedings
over the federal registration of a mark could have preclusive effect
in subsequent trademark litigation.' 31 The case concerned two par-
ties, B & B Hardware and Hargis Industries, that used similar
marks for similar products. Hargis Industries used the mark
"Sealtite," and B & B Hardware used the mark "Sealtight," both
127. See Lunney, supra note 109, at 424; Lemley & McKenna, supra note 109, at
143-44.
128. See generally Barton Beebe & Jeanne C. Fromer, Are We Running Out of Trade-
marks: An Empirical Study of Trademark Depletion and Congestion, 131 HARV. L. REV. 945,
(2018).
129. When trademark infringement litigation entails median litigation costs of be-
tween $325,000 and $1,600,000, depending on the value of the marks at issue, the AIPLA
Survey reports the median cost of a trademark opposition or cancellation proceeding as
$95,000. AIPLA, supra note 113, at 39. I recognize that this cost remains above the level
that some small businesses will be able to afford. A full exploration of how we might modify
trademark law to enable even these entities to participate fully in the trademark system is
beyond the scope of this Article.
130. 135 S. Ct. 1293, 1310 (2015).
131. Id.
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for metal fasteners. 132 The parties' dispute over their respective
trademark rights had been going on for years. 13 3 When Hargis In-
dustries attempted to register its mark federally, B & B Hardware
persuaded the TTAB that the marks were confusingly similar and
successfully opposed the registration. 134 This did not stop Hargis
Industries' actual use of the mark, however. 135 To do that, B & B
Hardware initiated separate trademark and unfair competition
litigation in federal district court in Arkansas. 136 As in the TTAB
proceeding, the central issue in the infringement litigation was
whether Hargis Industries' use created a likelihood of confusion. 137
To avoid an expensive trial on the issue, B & B Hardware argued
that the district court should give the TTAB decision preclusive
effect.138 But the Arkansas district court refused. It reasoned that
issue preclusion did not apply because: (1) the TTAB was an ad-
ministrative tribunal, not an Article III court, and (2) there were
some nontrivial differences in the likelihood-of-confusion stand-
ards the two decision-makers applied. 139 So instead of following
the TTAB's lead, the court re-tried the issue whether Hargis In-
dustries' mark created a likelihood of confusion to a jury, and the
jury concluded that there was no likelihood of confusion.140 On ap-
peal, the Eighth Circuit affirmed.141
The Supreme Court, however, reversed.1 42 Although the Court
did not rule that a TTAB decision on the likelihood-of-confusion
issue in the registration context would always have preclusive ef-
fect, the Court decisively rejected the various rationales the
Eighth Circuit had offered for refusing to follow the TTAB's
lead. 143 Neither the TTAB's status as an administrative agency ra-
ther than an Article III court, nor the minor differences in the fac-
tor tests the TTAB applied to determine the likelihood of confusion
were sufficient to foreclose issue preclusion. 144 While the Court
132. Id. at 1299.
133. As the Court notes, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office initially published
Hargis Industries' trademark for opposition in 2002. Id. at 1301. The Court's decision on
this litigation was issued thirteen years later, in 2015. Id. at 1293.
134. Id. at 1299, 1301-02.
135. Id. at 1302.
136. B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 736 F. Supp. 2d 1212, 1214 (E.D.
Ark. 2010), affd, 716 F.3d 1020 (8th Cir. 2013), rev'd, 135 S. Ct. 1293 (2015).
137. Id. at 1217.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 1217-18.
140. Id. at 1214.
141. 716 F.3d at 1020, 1027.
142. 135 S. Ct. at 1310.
143. Id. at 1306-10.
144. Id. at 1303, 1307-09.
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recognized that issue preclusion might not apply if the applicant
sought to register a different mark for different goods than those
at issue in the infringement litigation, the Court held that "[s]o
long as the other ordinary elements of issue preclusion are met,
when the usages adjudicated by the TTAB are materially the same
as those before the district court, issue preclusion should apply."145
By giving TTAB resolutions broader preclusive effect, the
Court has opened up a less expensive and quicker path for resolu-
tion of trademark disputes. Instead of litigating likelihood of con-
fusion through a far more expensive district court infringement
proceeding, parties can use the registration and opposition process
to resolve the issue. To be sure, it is not a perfect alternative for,
at least, three reasons. First, the standards for registration that
the TTAB applies have been infected by the same undue complex-
ity that the courts created for litigation. 146 Second, in resolving op-
positions, the TTAB applies an inappropriate rule of "doubt" that
preferences existing businesses over new entrants. 47 Third, the
court charged with appellate jurisdiction over the TTAB, the Fed-
eral Circuit and its predecessor, the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals, has demonstrated a strong pro-trademark owner, anti-
consumer bias in its decisions over the years.148
In the end, however, it is a choice of imperfections. Even if the
law governing trademark registration follows the same unneces-
sarily complex standards the courts made up for trademark litiga-
145. Id. at 1310.
146. Thus, on the facts of B&B Hardware, I agree with the jury that confusion was not
likely. While both companies used similar marks on metal fasteners, the metal fasteners
were for entirely different purposes. As the Court noted, "B & B manufactures fasteners for
the aerospace industry, while Hargis manufactures fasteners for use in the construction
trade." Id. at 1301. In my view, the jury was right in finding that this difference made
confusion unlikely. Of course, the likelihood-of-confusion standard is sufficiently broad and
amorphous to leave the fact-finder with the discretion to reach, as the TTAB did, a different
conclusion.
147. See, e.g., TBC Corp. v. Holsa, Inc., 126 F.3d 1470, 1473 (Fed. Cir. 1997) ("Finally,
as witness the fact that applicant has filed an intent to use application, the well estab-
lished rule that doubts are to be resolved against a newcomer and in favor of an established
longtime user applies here.').
148. Some of the more egregious examples include: (1) when the PTO refused to regis-
ter as a trademark the shape of a product previously protected by a design patent, the CCPA
reversed, In re Mogen David Wine Corp., 328 F.2d 925, 931-32 (C.C.P.A. 1964); (2) when
the PTO refused to register the shape of the Glass Plus bottle as a trademark on the grounds
that it was functional, the CCPA reversed and sharply narrowed the reach of the function-
ality doctrine, In re Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc., 671 F.2d 1332, 1343-44 (C.C.P.A. 1982);
and (3) when the PTO refused to register a uniform color applied to a product as a trade-
mark, the Federal Circuit reversed and held that a uniform color could constitute a regis-
terable trademark, In re Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 774 F.2d 1116, 1127-28 (Fed. Cir.
1985).
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tion, using the less expensive registration process and its associ-
ated dispute resolution mechanisms still offer a wider range of en-
tities access to the system. 149 While B & B Hardware makes this
alternative a viable choice for a wider range of disputes, we could
certainly take steps to encourage parties to pursue the registration
alternative. We could, for example, require proof of additional ele-
ments, impose heightened pleading standards, or establish a
higher burden of proof to establish infringement of trademarks
that a party has chosen not to register, as Professor Rebecca
Tushnet has suggested. 150
In addition to these two suggestions, I also offer this advice to
judges. Even if you think you know how to resolve the case in front
of you, take a step back before you start rewriting the rules. Even
if you are right about the case in front of you, you have no idea
where your decision may lead in the future or even how it would
apply to the full range of potential trademark cases in the present.
Stop trying to do justice; start following the law.
149. It may be that other mechanisms, such as private enforcement on dominant plat-
forms such as Facebook and eBay, or through crowd-sourced mechanisms, may also offer
practical alternatives for some parties in some cases. However, these alternatives operate
in the shadow of the law and may thus come to embody some of the law's undesirable com-
plexity. They may also have costs and imperfections of their own. Indeed, it would be a sad
day if the justice achieved by mobs were preferable to that achieved by law.
150. Tushnet, supra note 125, at 934-38.
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